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Abstract
Objectives This study aimed at reviewing and analysing the pharmaceutical pricing
policies implemented in two middle-east countries.
Methods Official documents related to national pharmaceutical pricing policies were
reviewed, and meetings with key informants in the registration and pricing departments
in the Qatari and Lebanese ministries of public health were conducted.
Key findings As of April 2017, the laws currently in effect in Qatar and Lebanon are
based on the latest versions of decrees enacted in 2011 and 2005 respectively. Both coun-
tries have implemented similar pharmaceutical pricing policies which apply only to the
private sectors in both countries. Landing price in Lebanon is either free-on-board (FOB)
or cost-insurance-freight (CIF) while it is only CIF in Qatar. External reference pricing
and mark-up regulations were two of the common policies identified in both countries.
For external reference pricing, the basket of countries considered and the price adopted
were different. Mark-ups were applied with different schemes along the pharmaceutical
supply chain in each country with Qatar imposing an overall higher mark-up margin.
Moreover, Qatar utilized health technology assessment whenever such economic evalua-
tion studies were available at the time of medicine registration. These pricing strategies
applied to both public and private sectors in Lebanon, while they only applied to the pri-
vate sector in Qatar.
Conclusions The pharmaceutical pricing policies implemented in Qatar and Lebanon
are reflective of both the advancements in the human capital and financial resources of
the nations and are in line with the World Health Organization-recommended pricing
policies for developing countries.
Keywords external reference pricing; health technology assessment; mark-up; pharma-
ceutical; price; pricing policy
Introduction
Access to medicines is a human right and some countries incorporate it in their
national constitution.[1–3] Achieving and fulfilling this right enhances the quality of an
individual’s life and sustains an adequate standard of health. Poor access is not always
related to technical issues. Other factors influencing access include social beliefs or
values, economic interests and political process.[4] World Health Organization (WHO)
identifies several barriers to access including high medicine prices, availability and
affordability.[5–7]
Governments can control different stages in the pharmaceutical supply chain. WHO
has provided governments with the following recommended methods to influence the
prices set by the manufacturers[8]:
1 Price controls on the manufacturer;
2 Profit controls on the manufacturer;
3 Reference pricing and brand premiums;
4 Comparing pricing controls (international benchmarking);
5 Eliminating tariffs and taxes;
6 Fixed margins;
7 Digressive mark-ups and
8 Capitation systems
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Review
In general, countries adopt varying strategies to manage
the pharmaceutical market. Some have minimal interven-
tions while other countries get fully engaged and intervene
by either subsidizing medicines or offering them for free to
their population. The latter case is what is encountered in
industrialized countries which are members of the Organiza-
tion of Economic and Co-operation and Development
(OECD).[9]
The final retail price at which patient buy the pharma-
ceutical is the result of various cumulative price compo-
nents added throughout the pharmaceutical value chain.
These factors vary widely among countries, and they
include[4]:
1 Basis for setting the original prices;
2 Shipping cost;
3 Distribution cost;
4 Import duties;
5 Taxes;
6 Product registration cost and
7 Transfer price
Usually, the ex-factory price or manufacturer selling
price (MSP) of a medicine is only an initial starting compo-
nent of the final retail price at which a patient purchases the
medicine.[4,7]
Inadequate access to medicines is most pronounced in
poor countries where people face difficulties due to medi-
cine price and availability whether in the public or private
sector.
While the right to be treated should be a basic right for
people around the world, this is not the case in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs). In these countries, peo-
ple are purchasing medicine out of pocket (OOP) because
of the lack of a comprehensive health insurance system
and inadequate publicly subsidized pharmaceutical ser-
vices.[10] Therefore, strategies to ameliorate access should
take into account improving affordability.[6] A close
inspection of the disparity in access across the world
sheds light on poor pharmaceutical policies and strategies.
This is due to discrepancy in medicine needs and chal-
lenges of each individual country. A financial burden on
households is usually accompanied with social and psy-
chological burdens. Such burdens can lead people to forgo
their medical treatment in favour of other living
expenses.[11]
In order to assess the general situation in the developing
countries, Abdel Rida et al.[12] conducted a systematic liter-
ature search to identify government strategies or guidelines
used to control the pharmaceutical pricing and to explore
their effects on the adopting nations. These strategies were
also assessed in view of WHO pricing policy guidelines.[6]
The WHO-recommended pricing policies as per the
‘WHO Guideline on Country Pharmaceutical Pricing
Policy’[6] were identified in the reviewed studies as repre-
sented in Figure 1 below:
The data confirmed a scarcity of pharmaceutical pricing
evaluative studies in developing countries as compared to
developed countries.[6,13,14] No significant relationship
between income level and types of policies implemented
was identified.
Although developing countries are implementing policies
as recommended by WHO guidelines, such policies have
not always been successful as reported in China[15] and
Indonesia.[16] Accordingly, each country should assess its
own health care and pharmaceutical situation and conse-
quently implement adequate policies and interventions.
After reviewing the impact of policies and the reality of
the pharmaceutical sector status in developing countries to
the extent permitted by the reviewed studies, robust research
targeting the analysis of pharmaceutical and pricing policy
in the developing countries should be conducted, taking into
consideration policy reform and adoption. With regard to
two developing countries, Qatar and Lebanon, a single
study by Kalό et al.[17] was identified. However, it did not
reflect the actual pricing policies implemented nor measure
the direct effect of these policies on the availability and
affordability of medicines in these two countries. The study
only identified and assessed ERP by comparing the price
corridor of pharmaceuticals that are subject to ERP versus
non-pharmaceuticals.
Both Qatar and Lebanon are Arab countries in the
MENA region and therefore fall under EMRO, the Eastern
Mediterranean Regional Office of the WHO. They differ in
terms of economic indicators due to the differences in
income levels (Table 1). While Qatar is a high-income
country, Lebanon is an upper-middle-income country.
A closer look demonstrated that both Qatar and Lebanon
reveal the absence of an established national pharmaceutical
policy[18]; however, both countries have put enormous efforts
to control the pharmaceutical sector[5] and to curb the high
prevalence of diseases especially the non-communicable dis-
ease (NCD) such as cardiovascular diseases ranked first and
second cause of death in Lebanon and Qatar respectively.[19]
Ensuring equitable access to medicines treating such diseases
is a cornerstone in the chronic disease’s pharmaceutical man-
agement. The price of medicines and the overall cost of ther-
apy are financial burdens and are key factors of medication
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Figure 1 Identified World Health Organization policies in reviewed
articles Source: Abdel Rida, Nada, & Mohamed Ibrahim, M. Izham
(2018). Medicines pricing policy and strategies in developing countries:
A review. In M. Izham Mohamed Ibrahim, A. I. Wertheimer, & Z. -U.
Din Babar (Eds.), Social and administrative aspects of pharmacy in
low- and middle-income countries: present challenges and future solu-
tions. Elsevier: Academic Press, 111–128.
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adherence, with lifelong payment for CVD medication is also
considered a barrier for adherence.[20]
Several non-governmental organizations (NGO) and
WHO acknowledge that in order to improve the availability
and the affordability of essential medicines, evidence-based
national policies and programmes must be developed. In the
same context, an editorial published in the British Medical
Journal (BMJ) after the World Health Assembly in 2000
drew attention to existing problems discussed in the WHO/
HAI report related to chronic disease management.[21]
According to BMJ: ‘the report’s findings make explicit what
has long been recognized: that the cost of medical care
impoverishes or is simply beyond the reach of many people
in developing countries. Amid the gloom, however, there is
some light. Simply collecting data and presenting it to gov-
ernments can stimulate action’.[4] Moreover, to develop a
suitable strategy for price control, it is imperative to under-
stand factors involved in medicine price setting. Therefore,
an in-depth review and analysis of pricing policies imple-
mented are vital to the endeavours undertaken by the
respective governments.
In this study, we aimed to comparatively review and
analyse the latest pharmaceutical pricing strategies adopted
in Qatar and Lebanon, and to compile our analysis in a con-
cise and accessible reference document.
Methods
Study design
A thorough review and reporting of the official government
documents (e.g. decrees, decisions and laws) related to
pharmaceutical policies in Qatar and Lebanon were con-
ducted. Moreover, meeting and discussions with active key
informants with knowledge of pharmaceutical pricing mech-
anisms, regulation and supply chain were held at a central
level (e.g. ministries). The discussions covered the pricing
mechanism of pharmaceuticals and delved into the various
price components throughout the different stages of the
medicine distribution chain. It was followed by official doc-
uments review and reporting.
Ethics
The authors obtained an exemption from Qatar University
Institutional Review Board institution.
Study location, setting and timeline
Location
The study is comparative and carried out in two Asian mid-
dle-eastern countries: Qatar and Lebanon.
Setting
To collect central level data, public entities involved in the
pharmaceutical pricing policies’ implementation and moni-
toring were visited. In Qatar, meetings were organized with
the Pharmacy and Drug Control Department (PDCD) at the
MOPH and the Drug Supply Department at Hamad Medical
Corporation (HMC) to investigate the retail price composi-
tion. These departments regulate the private and public sec-
tors’ medicine procurement processes respectively.
A similar process was followed in Lebanon, where meet-
ings were conducted with the Import/Export & Drug Regis-
tration Department at the Lebanese MoPH to investigate the
pricing mechanism. In addition, we also reviewed the results
of the WHO/HAI study conducted in 2013 to ascertain
compliance with pricing regulations.
Timeline
Research and review of documents and the meetings with
the key informants were conducted between December 2016
and April 2017. Any amendments to the guidelines and
policies during this period would have been reflected; how-
ever, there were no such amendments.
Population and sampling
Based on the geographical and centralization of govern-
ment bodies in the capitals of both countries, the investiga-
tional component of the survey was conducted centrally at
the respective ministries of public health and related sup-
ply departments. The selection of key informants was pur-
posive and followed a snowball sampling process. In total,
four personnel were met, one in Lebanon and three in
Qatar.
Table 1 Qatar and Lebanon economic indicators and demographics
Qatar Lebanon
GDP ($ bn) 164.64 47.08
Population (mn) 2.58† 6.24‡
Citizens (mn) 0.313§ 4.751‡
GDP per capita ($) 73 653 8047
Health expenditure ($ bn) 4.82 3.34
Public health expenditure ($ bn) 4.10 1.59
Private health expenditure ($ bn) 0.72 1.75
Pharmaceutical sales ($ bn) 0.52 1.64
Pharmaceutical sales, % of health
expenditure
10.90 49.00
Per capita spending on pharmaceuticals ($) 234 280
Spending on originator
pharmaceuticals ($ mn)
360.0 800.0
Spending on generic
pharmaceuticals ($ mn)
110.0 490.0
Source: (1) World Bank. Data, Indicators: The World Bank Group;
2016 [Available from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator]; (2) Business
Monitor International (BMI). Lebanon pharmaceuticals & healthcare
report Q3 2016: BMI Research, FitchGroup; 2016 [Available from:
www.bmiresearch.com]. (3) Business Monitor International. Qatar Phar-
maceuticals & healthcare report Q3 2016: BMI Research, FitchGroup;
2016 [Available from: www.bmiresearch.com].
bn, billion; GDP, gross domestic product; mn, million.
†Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (MDPS). Qatar popu-
lation number: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics; 2017
[Available from: http://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/Pages/default.aspx].
‡Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The World Factbook – Library:
Central Intelligency Agency; 2017 [Available from: https://www.c
ia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html].
§Snoj J. Population of Qatar by nationality report 2017 [Available from:
http://priyadsouza.com/population-of-qatar-by-nationality-in-2017/].
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Information and data collection procedure
Data collected from ministries websites and publications
were consolidated with the information gathered from indi-
viduals met at the respective ministries.
The data gathered regarding the price components and
the pharmaceutical pricing policies implemented in Qatar
and Lebanon were compared and illustrated using Microsoft
Word and Excel.
Results
Two official documents were reviewed in Qatar[22,23] and
three in Lebanon[18,24,25] (Table 2). These documents were
posted on the respective ministries websites and were con-
firmed to be the only documents to rely on for our study
as per the informants met at the ministries. While the phar-
maceutical pricing guideline available in Lebanon was
comprehensive, the Qatari pharmaceutical pricing guideline
issued for all GCC lacked the additional information about
one of the pharmaceutical pricing policies identified. The
mark-up scheme is different in each gulf country. Further
information was collected from the Ministry of Public
Health in Qatar.
Registration price
The laws currently in effect in Qatar and Lebanon are based
on the latest versions of decrees enacted in 2011 and 2005
respectively.[22,24] Over the years, the governments have
been revising the regulations governing medicine prices
either nationally as in Lebanon[4] or regionally in Qatar in
line with other members of the GCC.[23] Both Qatar and
Lebanon have implemented similar pharmaceutical pricing
policies. In 2012, cost-insurance-freight (CIF) was adopted
as the landed price for pharmaceutical registration in the pri-
vate sector in all GCC member states.[23] To set a price for
registration, Qatar is mainly relying on the ex-factory and
selling price of the medicines in the country of origin, as
well as the CIF price in up to 30 countries to which the
medicines were exported and sold.[22] As for Lebanon, the
landing price could be either CIF or free-on-board (FOB)
price depending on the purchase and shipping agreement
between buyers and sellers.[25]
Pharmaceutical pricing policies
Our review of the price components as per national decrees
and pricing guidelines was limited to the add-ons to the
agreed-upon landed price for registration.
The pharmaceutical pricing policies in Lebanon apply to
all sectors except the primary health centres (PHC) where
medicines are procured through the Young Men’s Christian
Association (YMCA) and are dispensed for free.
In Qatar, the public and private sectors have distinct pro-
curement and pricing mechanisms. The public sector is mas-
sively subsidized. The medicines are procured through
different channels, mostly through GCC bulk procurement,
in addition to other agreements directly with manufacturers,
local agents or from local manufacturing. The pricing mech-
anism in the public sector is not disclosed; however, prices
of medicine were observed to be much lower than the pri-
vate sector. The low prices are mainly due to the bulk pro-
curement and public tendering processes and low total
cumulative mark-up margin. The range of mark-up schemes
varies from 2 to 10% on the purchased price.
External reference pricing (ERP) is one of the pricing
policies adopted by both countries, albeit with different bas-
kets of reference countries. This pricing policy is used to
price originator brands and thereafter for most of the newly
launched on-patent medicines in the country. The basket of
countries to which the prices in each country are bench-
marked varies. In Lebanon, prices are benchmarked against
three sets of prices with the lowest price adopted: ex-factory
and patient selling price of medicines in the country of ori-
gin; basket 1 which is composed of seven European coun-
tries; and basket 2 comprised of neighbouring Arab
countries including Qatar.[25] Regardless of the landed price
at registration and the pricing strategy used to set a registra-
tion price for a pharmaceutical, mark-ups are applied with
different schemes along the pharmaceutical supply chain in
both countries. While a decree detailing all the different
mark-up schemes is available to the public in Lebanon,[18]
such detailed scheme is not available in Qatar. In Lebanon,
the MoPH decision 306/1 of 2005 was continuously
reviewed with the latest update being decision 796/1 in
2014, adopting the lowest price out of any of the price com-
parisons considered for registration (Table 2). The different
CIF and free-on-board (FOB) tranches were lately updated
as well in decision 1131/1 in 2014 by the addition of a new
tranche for expensive in-patient medicines.[26] Table 3
demonstrates the various regressive and cumulative mark-up
add-ons to medicines in Lebanon based on FOB and CIF
price. As mentioned above, tranche E represents mainly in-
patient formulation where specialized skills are required for
the preparation. For this tranche, a new decision 1131/1
enacted in 2014 has allowed the addition of 8% as dispens-
ing fees followed by $86 as a fixed mark-up.[25]
Some imported medicines are exempt from taxes. These
include medicines manufactured in Arab countries or
medicines imported under EUR1 trade agreement. Such
details are withheld within the Ministry of Finance. Table 4
shows some government encouragement of local manufac-
turer efforts. In Qatar, the maximum mark-up allowed in the
GCC was set at 45% and Qatar adopted a uniform cumula-
tive mark-ups’ scheme of 44% (Figure 2). Although pricing
mechanism is not disclosed, HMC applies a mark-up rang-
ing from 2 to 10% on the landing price. In Qatar, the add-
on cost in the private sector is defined and linear. All MSP
prices are CIF based in USD. Figure 2 below illustrates
these mark-up schemes. Given that the mark-up in Lebanon
is variable and regressive depending on the CIF or FOB
price and whether the medicine is exempted from taxes or
not, we compared the different mark-up ranges added to
medicines registered under the same condition in Lebanon
as in Qatar. Figure 3 illustrates medicines that were
imported as CIF and exempt from taxation in Lebanon as
compared to all medicines imported in the private sector in
Qatar. Only the medicines with CIF up to 10.70$ and 52.52
$ have cumulative mark-up schemes higher and equal,
respectively, to those added to medicines registered in
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Table 2 Primary features and characteristics of the pharmaceutical pricing policies and regulation in Qatar and Lebanon
Qatar Lebanon
National decree and law • Decree number (1-10-1432) in 2011 • Decision 1/306 in 2005
• Amendment decision 1/796 in 2014
Pricing mechanism • Ex-factory price and retail price in the
country of origin
• Price in countries where the medicine is marketed
• Proposed cost
• Pharmacoeconomic considerations may be
considered if available
• Therapeutic significance
• Price benchmarking to several countries: country
of origin and other importing countries
• CIF price to KSA and thereafter Qatar
imposes 44%
• OB price is reduced by 20% upon
registration of first generic
• Ex-factory price and retail price in the country
of origin
• Review of shipping certificate (CIF or FOB)
to either: Jordan, KSA, Kuwait, Oman, UAE,
Bahrain and Qatar or France, UK, Belgium,
Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Portugal
• Adopt the lowest MSP, and the lowest FOB among
neighbouring and basket countries (796/1)
• Repricing every 5 years
Generic pricing mechanism • First generic is 35% less than OB
• Second generic is 10% less than first generic
• Third generic is 10% less than second generic
• All subsequent generics are 10%
less than third generic
• Generic is priced on the same mechanism as OB,
and price to consumer is at least 30% less than OB
(1/728 in 2013)
• If no OB is registered, prices are reviewed 3 months
after third generic is registered and average price
is adopted
• If the OB price was changed, the generics price
should be changed in a rate that halves that of OB
Locally manufactured/Packed
pricing mechanism
• Locally manufactured generic: same
pricing mechanism as generic
• If generics were already registered, then
existing price applies
• Generic package under license: same
pricing mechanism as generic
• OB manufacturing and packaging under
license: same pricing mechanism as OB
• Locally manufactured: adopt ex-factory price
• Packaged under license: adopt ex-factory price in
country of origin
• If generic, price must be at least 30% lower than OB
Basket of countries • Country of origin
• Other GCC countries
• All other countries where medicine
is exported
• Country of origin
• Neighbouring countries
• France, UK, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy,
Spain and Portugal
Pharmaceutical pricing policy • ERP
• Mark-up regulation
• HTA
• Promotion of the use of generics
• ERP
• Mark-up regulation
• Promotion of the use of generics
Importing currency • USD • Several currencies according to exporting
country and purchase currency
Price adjustments for
exchange rate Fluctuations
• Occasionally (QAR is pegged to USD) • Updated every 2 weeks
Shipping agreement • Private: CIF
• Public: various agreement
• Public and private: CIF or FOB
Mark-up • Public: variable depending on the
shipping agreement
• Private: uniform
• Private: digressive mark-up
Price tag in the
private sector
• Set by the PDCD in MOPH • Set by wholesaler, adjusted by pharmacist
in case of variation in price indices (exchange rate)
CIF, cost-insurance-freight; FOB, free-on-board; HMC, Hamad Medical Corporation; KSA, Saudi Arabia; LPG, lowest-price generic; MOPH, Min-
istry of Public Health; OB, originator brand; MSP, manufacturer selling price; PDCD, Pharmaceutical and Drug Control Department; QAR, Qatari
riyal; UAE, United Arab Emirates; USD, US dollar.
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Qatar. At all time, the wholesaler mark-up in Qatar is higher
than any CIF price range in Lebanon.
Additionally, Qatar may consider the economic evalua-
tion of a medicine to set the price if such evaluation or
health technology assessment (HTA) is available at the time
of registration.[22] As such, relevant information was gath-
ered directly from the public entities in charge of the pro-
cess. Table 2 below summarizes the details pertinent to our
study aim.
Both Qatar and Lebanon are promoting the use of gen-
eric medicines by setting their prices lower than the origina-
tor brand. In the private sector, the price of the first generic
registered in Qatar is 35% less than the originator. With
each new generic registered, the price is set at 10% less
than the preceding generic until the fourth one. Upon the
registration of the first generic in the Qatari pharmaceutical
market, the price of the originator brand is reduced by 20%
automatically.[22] For the few generics found in the public
sector in Qatar, no price difference was reported compared
to the originator brands as per the ministry. Based on dis-
cussions with HMC personnel, the HMC allocates a
weighted average to the active ingredient price depending
on the overall stock in use in various facilities with minimal
impact to the end user price. As for Lebanon where the
market for generics is active, the price of generic medicines
is at least 30% less than their comparative originator.[25]
The price of generics of the same active ingredient is
revised and reduced once five different generics brands are
registered in the country. If no originator brand is regis-
tered, the price of generics is reviewed once three generics
are available in the market and average price is adopted.
Generally, the price of generic brands is pegged to the origi-
nator; this results in price review for both originator and
generic brands every 5 years. Hence, any change in the OB
price is translated in a change of the generic brand at a rate
that equals half that of the originator. The MOPH in Leba-
non is also promoting the use of generics by supporting the
local packaging and manufacturing of pharmaceutical as
expressed by a higher profit margin (higher mark-up
schemes) applied to local manufactured generics as per
Table 4.
Discussion
The aim was to review the pharmaceutical pricing policies
nationwide and across nations. By reviewing governmental
Table 3 Different pharmaceutical mark-up schemes in percentage (%) applied to medicines in Lebanon
1 2 3 4 5 6
Tranche† Cost of freight and insurance
(only if FOB)
Custom clearance, import tax
and others
Importer and wholesaler
mark-up
Pharmacist
mark-up
Base/100
Without custom With custom
A 7.00 6.00 11.00 10.00 30.00 143.00
B 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 30.00 143.00
C 4.00 3.00 8.00 9.00 27.00 138.43
D 3.00 2.50 7.50 8.00 24.00 133.92
E 1.50 1.50 6.50 6.50 $86.00 $86+106.50
FOB, free-on-board.
Source: Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). Decision 796/1 Beirut: Ministry of Public Health; 2014 [Available from: http://www.moph.gov.lb/en/la
ws#/Laws/view/19.
†Wider range for locally manufactured medicines.
Table 4 Tranches divisions per FOB and CIF prices in Lebanon
Tranche FOB price $ CIF price $ Local product price $
A 0–10 0–10.70 0–11.34
B 10–50 10.70–52.50 11.34–55.13
C 50–100 52.5–104 55.13–107.12
D 100–300 104–309 107.12–316.72
E 300–and above 309–and above 316.72–and above
CIF, cost-insurance-freight; FOB, free-on-board.
Source: Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). Decision 796/1 Beirut:
Ministry of Public Health; 2014 [Available from: http://www.moph.
gov.lb/en/laws#/Laws/view/19.
Inclusion of FOB/CIF to any tranche is related to the exchange indices.
4%
15%
25%
Mark-up
Custom clearance, demurral Wholesaler, importer Pharmacist
Figure 2 Different cumulative mark-up schemes applied uniformly to
all medicines in the private sector in Qatar.
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documents and interviewing stakeholders, our results pro-
vided a clearer understanding of the pharmaceutical situa-
tion in Qatar and Lebanon.
The pharmaceutical sector is a major subset of the health
sector especially with spending on pharmaceuticals consti-
tuting a high percentage of the total health expendi-
ture.[6,27,28] In Lebanon, almost half of the health
expenditure is attributed to purchase of pharmaceuticals.[29]
Unethical behaviours such as substandard/falsified
medicines, price gouging and medicines misuse along the
supply chain and utilization can have a negative impact on
patient health and well-being. It can also waste public
resources and can be impoverishing for patients.[30–32] Close
monitoring, auditing and increased transparency of the phar-
maceutical supply chain from the seller or manufacturer
until it reaches the patients are necessary regardless of the
pharmaceutical and economic status of the country.[32]
Undeniably, constant monitoring and review of the prices of
pharmaceutical or health expenditure is a common practice
worldwide.[33] Different actions taken by stakeholders that
are controlling the medicine supply chain result in a com-
plex interplay whereby some governments may not be fully
aware of the cumulative price components. The regulation
of these components has a considerable impact on the pub-
lic price (retail price) and improves access.[34] Whether or
not a government should intervene in product pricing is
debatable in most cases, unless the product in question can
determine quality of life and survival. The documented peri-
odic review and adjustment of the original regulations in
both Qatar and Lebanon have generally resulted in benefi-
cial effects for the patients. For instance, the WHO/HAI sur-
vey on prices, availability and affordability of medicines,
was conducted twice in Lebanon in 2003 and 2013 after
which several laws were amended.[4,24] Another example of
such periodic reviews is China where the pharmaceutical
pricing policy had been subject to several updates and
adjustments between 2004 and 2015.[15,35–37]
Manufacturer selling price is the agreed-upon medicine
price before shipping to the buyer. This agreed-upon price
can be set based on the pricing policy adopted for a specific
drug. The shipping fees can be either CIF (Qatar and Leba-
non) or FOB (in Lebanon only), which results in the landed
price. The price of originator brand is set based on either
benchmarking with a predefined basket of countries or
decided based on the economic evaluation or therapeutic
value of the drug. As for the generic brand drug, the price
is usually determined as a predefined percentage discount to
their comparative originators and/or in relation to the price
of other pre-existing generic brands in the market.[22,25]
Thereafter, the landed price is generally subject to additive
and cumulative price components that can increase the final
price from 30% to more than 100% in some countries.[8]
While MSP is related to the procurement type and channels
and the negotiation power and market volume of a nation,
the price components added to landed price are a good indi-
cation of the effectiveness of a national pharmaceutical pric-
ing policy, the pharmaceutical sector structure and
regulation.[4,8,38] While some of the incremental costs men-
tioned above are indispensable, others can be waived or
should not be included in the final price. Some governments
decide to exempt essential medicines from taxes as in the
case of Qatar, and in general, patients should not be charged
for the drug registration fees.[4]
WHO/HAI separates the medicines’ price components in
up to five stages. MSP and the shipping cost are the first
stage of this cascade. The comprehension of the price esca-
lation at each stage helps understanding the pharmaceutical
value chain and therefore empowers advocates and govern-
ments to take the appropriate actions towards supplying
public with affordable drugs.
Use of external reference pricing
Qatar and Lebanon apply different pricing mechanisms for
medicine registration. For medicines priced based on exter-
nal reference pricing (ERP), three main approaches exist for
allowed price setting. Lebanon is assigning the lowest prices
available[18,25] similar to Portugal and Iran,[39] while Qatar
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Figure 3 Comparison of mark-up
schemes added to cost-insurance-
freight in Qatar and Lebanon.
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and Ireland are using the average price,[22] and Italy is
adopting the weighted average price.[40] The four pharma-
ceutical pricing policies identified in our study are among
the six recommended by the WHO for developing coun-
tries. The pharmaceutical pricing in Qatar and Lebanon is
mainly based on ERP and mark-up regulations. In addi-
tion, Qatar may consider the economic evaluation and ther-
apeutic importance of a medicine to set the price if such
evaluation is available at the time of registration.[41] Fur-
thermore, ERP and mark-up regulation were the most
adopted in developing countries as per Abdel Rida
et al.[12] Most of the industrialized countries are endeav-
ouring to apply aggressive strategies to control pharmaceu-
tical expenditures.[42] ERP is widely implemented for on-
patent medicines.[43,44] As of 2011, 24 out of the 27 Euro-
pean Union countries (EU) covered in the RAND report
used ERP with the exception of Sweden, the UK and Den-
mark.[45] As previously mentioned, ERP is a dynamic pro-
cess to price on-patent and prescription only medicines
including reimbursable medicines.[44,45] Moreover, the
trend is towards including countries of similar income
levels as the country applying the policy.[43] The supply
chain remuneration (mark-ups) is also relatively regulated
in these countries through either a fixed fee, a fixed per-
centage or a fee-for-service.[34,44,46] To set a price for reg-
istration, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are mainly relying on the
ex-factory and selling price of the medicines in the country
of origin, as well as the CIF price in up to 30 countries to
which the medicines are exported and sold. In selecting a
basket of countries, most common practice in Europe is
usually to include up to 10 countries in the basket,[43] and
to use either the lowest price, the average price or the
weighted average price as a reference.[40] Recently, studies
were reporting that the Chinese government has been con-
sidering to use ERP, and are seeking to identify a basket
of reference countries that adhere to Chinese financial and
social values.[47]
Regulation of mark-ups in the pharmaceutical
supply distribution chain
Moreover, the mark-up schemes applied in both countries
are also different. These different policy implementation
mechanisms validate the conclusions of international organi-
zations that: ‘there is no one-size solution’ that fits all.[6]
For the mark-up regulation, it is recommended that once
established, the government should progress to regressive
mark-up schemes.[6] Lebanon and Saudi Arabia[25,48,49] are
already applying it, while Qatar still has a uniform mark-up
of 44% to all medicines registered and sold in the private
sector regardless of the registered CIF price.
Use of health technology assessment
Although some countries attempt to use health technology
assessment (HTA) to price medicines, its implementation is
challenging for developing economies due to demanding
human capital and financial needs.[6,50,51] In some countries
where HTA was being considered and implemented, eco-
nomic evaluation studies revealed poor practices and fewer
methodological flaws in the low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs)[52] as well as in Saudi Arabia,[53] Iran[54] and
Thailand.[51] South Korea, an OECD country, has switched
from the use of cost-plus and ERP to implementing HTA
since 2007.[55,56] No negative feedback has been reported
from the country. This may be due to South Korea having
the required human capital and financial resources to best
adopt HTA.
Promotion of the use of generic medicines
To promote the use of generic medicines, two approaches
are essential: supply-side and demand-side strategies.[6,57]
Qatar and Lebanon had been implementing supply-side
strategies by ensuring the market entry and setting compet-
itive prices for generic medicines compared to the origina-
tor brands.[22,25] Moreover, Lebanon is encouraging the
local manufacturing of medicines mainly by providing
manufacturers, distributors and pharmacists a higher mar-
gin of profit by applying a higher mark-up scheme com-
pared to imported medicines within the same price tranche.
Qatar has recently realized the importance of domesticating
the production of generic medicines; therefore, measures
had been taken to encourage local manufacturing of
medicines by accelerating their licensing and registration,
subsidizing the establishment of manufacturing plants as
well financial and commercial support. Most industrialized
countries have implemented policy tools to increase the
market share and volume of generics.[13] This resulted in
increased affordability of medicines and substantial savings
in healthcare expenditure.[58,59] For instance, the United
Kingdom (UK) is strictly prohibiting the use of brand
names in the prescriptions.[13] Bangladesh and Iran are two
developing countries that undertook strategies to promote
the use of generic medicines since 1980s by adopting sup-
ply-side strategy initiatives including promotion of local
manufacturing and ensuring availability of generic medici-
nes, which has resulted in continuous growth of the gen-
eric medicines’ market.[60,61] With regard to the demand-
side strategy options, the public sector in Lebanon is
mostly procuring and dispensing generic medicines[48]
while the public dispensing outlets in Qatar rarely dispense
generic brands. This could be related to the varying eco-
nomic status and distinct national subsidy vision of the
healthcare systems in these two countries.[62] In the private
sector, the Lebanese pharmaceutical market is more open
for generic medicine, regulations are already in place to
encourage generic prescription and substitutions, and
patients tend to buy generics for financial reasons.[63,64]
The Qatari population prefers originator brands and shows
resistance for generic medicines’ uptakes.[65] With the pub-
lic sector being the major provider of pharmaceuticals in
Qatar where there is no price difference between medicine
types, patients are not incentivized to seek generic over
originator brands. Similarly, most patients visiting the pri-
vate sector are insured and the market is lightly penetrated
by generic brands. Moreover, the pharmacists in Qatar do
not have the authority to substitute a generic for an origi-
nator brand and do not have access to national formulary
of substitution options.
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Limitations
This study relied on core elements that strengthen its out-
comes. This is the first study to document and compare the
pharmaceutical pricing policies in two Arab middle-eastern
countries and to emphasize the different implementation
approaches of the same pricing strategies. Such studies pro-
vide valuable advocacy messages for policymakers, pharma-
ceutical industry, regulators, prescribers and patients if it is
shared and delivered in a timely manner. However, several
limitations existed that may have impacted the findings.
Due to time limitations and lack of institutional support, the
price components of medicines were not surveyed. This
could have helped in providing more in-depth of medicine
price composition. Moreover, the study was limited to the
official pharmaceutical pricing policies’ documents pub-
lished by the governments due to the lack of available liter-
ature. As such, the findings and analysis provided in this
article deliver advocative and informative message to differ-
ent stakeholders and establish a foundation for other schol-
ars to elaborate on the subject.
Recommendation
Based on what have been presented in this study, the Min-
istry of Public Health in Qatar is recommended to publish
an updated pharmaceutical pricing policy that is inclusive
and encompasses the new government vision in terms of
healthcare sustainability goal. We recommend Qatari gov-
ernment to switch to regressive mark-up on pharmaceuticals
and to reconsider the wholesaler mark-up margin. Also,
there should be a thoughtful consideration of local manufac-
turing of generic medicines for local consumption and
export. Implementing a pro-generic policy by promoting
generic medicines as a substitute and educating physicians,
pharmacists and patients about the benefits of generics
would be useful. Moreover, legally enabling pharmacists to
offer and provide generic substitutes is highly recom-
mended. As for Lebanon, given the rare incidence of falsi-
fied and substandard medicines reported, it is recommended
to test and ensure the quality of generics available in the
private pharmaceutical market. Lastly, the Lebanese govern-
ment is encouraged to exempt essential medicines from
taxes.
This study revealed several issues that need further anal-
ysis and review. To better understand the pharmaceutical
supply chain, a detailed analysis of the public procurement
system is required.
Conclusion
This study demonstrated that both countries were using
multiple internationally recognized pharmaceutical pricing
policies simultaneously.
The pharmaceutical pricing policies implemented in
Qatar and Lebanon are reflective of both the advancements
in the human capital and financial resources of the nations
and are in line with the WHO-recommended pharmaceutical
pricing policies for developing countries. However, more
tailoring of these policies to the local environment is
required for greater benefit to the populations given the sub-
stantially high prices of medicines especially in the private
sectors and their low availability in various sectors. One
area of focus should be the optimization and implementa-
tion of various supply and demand strategies for the promo-
tion of generic medicines’ availability and affordability.
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